Despite the "minimal effects" conventional wisdom, the question of whether campaign advertising influence elections outcome remains open. This is paradoxical because in the absence of a causal link from advertising to candidate performance, it is difficult to rationalize the amounts spent on campaigns in general, and on TV advertising in particular. Most studies using US data, however, suffer from omitted variable bias and reverse causality problems caused by the decentralized market-based method of allocating campaign spending and TV advertising. In contrast with received literature, we explore a quasi-natural experiment produced by the Brazilian electoral legislation, and show that TV and radio advertising has a much larger impact on election outcomes than previously found by the literature. In Brazil, by law, campaign advertising is free of charge and allocated among candidates in a centralized manner. Gubernatorial elections work in a runoff system. While in the first round, candidates' TV and radio time shares are determined by their coalitions' share of seats in the national parliament, the two most voted candidates split equally TV time if a second round is necessary. Thus, differences in TV and radio advertising time between the first and second rounds are explored as a source of exogenous variation to evaluate the impact of TV advertising on election outcomes. Estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in TV time causes a 0.241 percentage point increase in votes. Since TV advertising is the most important item in campaign expenditures, this result sheds light on the more general question of the effect of campaign spending on elections outcome.
"More generally, for the vast subfield of voting behavior and elections, determining whether political campaigns influence individual vote choice and election outcomes has become a Holy Grail." Goldstein and Ridout on the Annual Review of Political Science (2004) 
I -INTRODUCTION
Political scientists, economists and policy makers have held a long interest in how political campaigns affect voting behavior. The impact of campaign spending in general, and of electoral advertising in particular, have attracted special attention (among many examples, see Welch (1981) , Green and Krasno (1988) , Abramowitz (1991) , Levitt (1994) on campaign spending, and Zaller (1996 ( ), Finkel (1993 , and Goldstein and Ridout (2004) on TV advertising). Policy implications are almost self-evident. If money buys elections, it calls for regulation on campaign expenditure (or a more drastic centralized solution with public campaign funding), assuming a policy goal of minimizing the influence of economic power on election results. If campaign spending is irrelevant, then policy discussions on public financing, both in the United States and other large countries such as Brazil, are grounded on a false premise. The effect of TV advertising is equally important, for campaign managers and policy makers alike. This paper estimates the impact of TV and radio advertising on the elections outcome and, in contrast with most received literature, finds a large impact. Since the most important item on campaign spending is TV advertising (Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996) ), the difference between campaign spending and TV advertising is largely immaterial. 1 Despite the strong policy interest, and a large body of literature, there is still no consensus on the issue.
Although there is a "minimal-effects" conventional wisdom that campaign spending and TV advertising have little impact on elections outcome (Gerber (2004) , Levitt (1994) ), a paradox remains. 2 If money and TV are irrelevant, how can we rationalize the not-so-trivial sums spent on campaigns in general, and on advertising in particular? 3 1 It seems intuitive to use TV advertising as proxy for campaign spending. Political scientists, however, have done just the opposite, using spending as a measure for advertising (see Goldstein and Ridout (2004) ). This only reinforces our perception that these two variables are one and the same. 2 Bartels (1993) , for example, calls the literature on media effects "one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science." 3 In the 2000 election, roughly U$ 3 billion were raised and spent by candidates and party committees. How large this number is debatable. Tullock's puzzle posits that campaign contributions are low when compared with the federal governments' gross investment and consumption (some 590 billion), which is the (maximum) amount "up for grabs" by special interests. See Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) . Nevertheless, consider GM, the third largest advertiser in the US in 2006, for a sense of the magnitudes involved. GM spent 2.2 billion dollars in measured media. US revenues were 201 billion. Thus, political campaign advertising intensity is not much lower than GM's. See Advertising Age, June, 25 th , 2007. Official Brazilian numbers are considerably lower. According to Transparência Brasil, an affiliated of Transparency International, total official campaign receipts in the 2002 national elections were close to R$400 millions (roughly U$ 110 million at the 10/02 exchange rate). However, there is evidence of significant covert campaign contribution and money rose by other illegal means. In 2005, for example, a large scale political scandals unveiled a large scheme of funneling money from state enterprises to fund political campaigning. See The Economist, June, 2 nd , 2005 "Brazil bribery scandal: Jeffersonian democracy, tropical style." Even if campaign spending and TV advertising do impact election results, identifying its effect is far from trivial, especially with US data. The reason lies in the decentralized, market-based method of campaign financing, In this case, campaign funding, spending and TV advertising are a choice of political actors (candidates and donors), and the observed quantums are equilibrium values. Starting from equilibrium, one would expect a small effect of variations in any of these variables, otherwise it would not be an equilibrium.
Suppose one candidate, wealthy and unknown, faces a popular opponent whose support base is poor. Under reasonable assumptions about the production function of votes as a function of advertising, the equilibrium has the former with large disbursement strategy, and the later with a low disbursement, and votes are split. In this case, the raw relationship between spending and votes is indeed zero, although spending influence voting. 4 An analogy could be made with an ordinary industry: using GM and FORD advertising outlays and their market shares, one would probably find no relationships between these two variables. Why would they spend this money?
From an econometric perspective, the decentralized allocation causes at least two serious problems for measuring the relationship between campaign spending/TV advertising and election outcomes: reverse causality and omitted factors. 5 Reverse causality arises because stronger candidates should receive more contributions if donors expect their money to have an impact on policy making. 6 Electoral district and candidate unobserved heterogeneity cause omitted variable bias, normally a bias away from zero. One example: more able candidates may be better at raising money, or people may prefer to donate to more competent candidates. If ability is unobservable to econometrician, then the campaign expenditures will capture (some of) the link from competence to elections' outcome, producing a bias away from zero in estimates.
Papers that attempt to measure the impact of campaign spending or TV advertising on election outcomes using cross-sectional data are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, with pure cross-sectional data, it is hard to account to unobserved quality heterogeneity among candidates. Gerger (1998), for example, try to control for the quality of contenders by including biographical information, such as dummies for whether the contender previously occupied an elected office, which capture only one possible dimension of quality. Gerber (1998) also use contender wealth to instrument for campaign expenditures, hoping to account for reverse causality. However, successful business men and politicians share many (unobserved) characteristics. Thus, if quality is not convincingly controlled for to begin with, wealth will correlate with unobservable determinants of elections outcome. Welch (1981) use demographic characteristics of the district, such as inequality and educational attainment, arguing that they determine donations but not voting behavior, which is quite debatable.
Second, it is also challenging to account for all relevant electoral district heterogeneity. A republican candidate running in a predominantly democratic district will face difficulty in raising money and getting votes.
Or democrats in predominantly democratic district will not bother to raise any money. Either way, if the district political inclinations are not properly controlled for, results will again be biased, with the direction of the bias undetermined. 7 Welch (1981) uses an interesting approach to account for district heterogeneity, using party affiliation and Gerald Ford's share of votes in the district as controls. Although these variables most certainly capture some district preferences, they are far from perfect. Much better if the same district is observed more than once, which demands a panel approach.
The most convincing work in the early literature combines cross-sectional and time-series data. Levitt (1994) examines situations in which the same pair of candidates faces each other more than once in elections for the house of representatives. A panel strategy is adopted: an observation is pair candidate/pair -election. By first differencing the data, Levitt (1994) can account for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among candidates and electoral districts. His estimates suggest a modest effect of campaign expenditures on the outcome of elections.
There is however one major problem with Levitt's strategy. If candidates' strength vary over elections, the procedure will not it solve the problem of reverse causality. More generally, the procedure only account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and candidates and districts' characteristics may change significantly over elections. Relatively common occurrences, such as charges of corruption, sexual related scandals, immigration, or increase minority mobilization, may considerably change voters' perceptions and candidates' ability to raise money. If elections are sufficiently apart in time, these concerns are less damaging. With the low frequency of US legislative elections (every two years), one cannot dismiss the charges. 8
In this paper, we use the Brazilian electoral legislation to overcome the problems of omission and reverse causality that plague most empirical studies in the literature. TV time allocation is centralized, producing a quasinatural experiment. Gubernatorial elections work in two-round system. The runoff round happens if no candidate reaches 50% plus one of the votes in the first round, in which case the two most voted candidates runoff to decide the winner. For a period of time before each round, TV and radio broadcasters are obliged by law to air candidates' advertising, free of charge. The law determines that, before the first round, time is allocated among candidates according to the coalitions' share of representation at the National parliament. Before the second round, however, the two runner-off candidates split the time equally. Hence, the difference between first and second round TV and radio time share is a source of exogenous variation in TV advertising time, over a short 7 While the former story would push estimates away from zero, the latter would bias estimates towards zero. 8 Levitt (1994) attempts to address these issues by including both year dummies, and dummies indicating whether the candidate was involved in a scandal. Year dummies only account for time specific effects, and are useful only if voters' perceptions towards evolved in the same manner. Scandal dummies -derived from only one source (Congressional Quarterly) -suggest there were but seven candidates involved in scandals over the sample, which contains 633 elections and 598 candidates, a number rather small to be plausible. In addition to evaluating how TV advertising time impacts elections outcome, we explore the crosssection variation in our sample to investigate how this impact varies with some city-level demographics. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is novelty of this paper, made possible by the wide variation in city demographics for same election event. 10 The influence of TV advertising is stronger in larger, less educated, more urban, poorer and more unequal cities. All four "slope shifters" have the expected sign, and are significant both statistically and practically. These findings help reconcile our result that TV advertising matters with the "minimal effects" conventional wisdom. Brazil is an urbanized, poorly education, highly unequal middle income country. Hence, it scores 4.5 out of 5 in the characteristics that augment the influence of TV advertising on election outcomes. Perhaps, special conditions must be met in order for campaign spending and TV advertising to have an impact.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, the Brazilian electoral system is described in detail, with emphasis on the legislation on TV time allocation. Section III describes the data and section IV outlines the estimation strategy. Results are in section V, and section VI concludes.
II -ELECTORAL ADVERTISING IN BRAZIL
In studies using U.S. data, the empirical evaluation of the impact of electoral advertising (the most important by-product of campaign expenditures) on elections' outcomes face two serious methodological problems. First, campaign expenditures and electoral advertising are related to candidates' characteristics such as ability, competence, or how the candidate's platform benefits special groups at the expense of voters. Not all, if any, of these characteristics are observable. Thus, omission of relevant covariates is a problem. Second, candidates that have a better chance of winning to begin with are more likely to receive campaign contributions.
If this ex-ante electoral strength is unobservable, then a reverse causality bias arises. 11 In summary, campaign spending (and consequently TV advertising) is determined in decetralized market system, and observed quantities are equilibrium values produced by the strategic interaction of the choices of the agents.
In Brazil, in contrast, TV and radio advertising is determined in a centralized manner. The Brazilian electoral legislation produces an exogenous variation in TV advertising time, and allows us to circumvent the problems of omitted variable and reverse causality that plague most studies in the literature. Before continuing, a (very) short digression to describe the Brazilian political system.
Brazil is a presidential federal republic comprising 26 states and one federal district, where the capital Brasília is. The executive branch of the federal government is headed by the President of Brazil, while the legislative branch consists of two houses -the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. In each state government, as well as in the government of the federal district, the head of the executive branch is a governor, and the legislative branch consists of the State Assembly. The president, the governors, the members of the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the State Assemblies are elected by direct ballot every four years for four-year terms, except for the senators, who serve eight-year terms. 12 Brazil has a multi-party system. The current number of active political parties in the country is close to thirty. Of course, only some of such parties are relevant at the national level -as data will show in the next section.
Gubernatorial elections work in a runoff system. 13 All properly registered candidates participate on the first round. If no candidate reaches 50% plus one votes, there is a second round, in which the two most voted first-round candidates participate. Second-round winner is the one who receives most valid votes. 14 There is a three-week interval between the first and the second round. Table I shows the dates of first and second rounds of the three gubernatorial elections in our sample : 1998, 2002, and 2006. 11 The task of controlling for strength is in fact more complicated than just described. Strength of candidacy unveils over the electoral process, so controlling for ex-ante strength might not be enough. One would need a measure of strength previous to every time a donation was made. 12 Each state has three senators, two of them coincide, and overlap with the other: at every four year cycle either one or two, but never all three, seats are disputed. 13 Mayoral elections in cities larger than 200thd inhabitants also work on a runoff system. We concentrate on gubernatorial elections for two reasons. First, different cities are several observations on the same pair election-state. For mayoral elections, we would have only one observation for each pair election-city. Therefore data from mayoral elections are intrinsically noisier. Second, and more importantly, TV advertising should have a larger impact in elections in large, geographically disperse elections. For cities, particularly smaller ones, other means of campaign communications may be more important than TV and radio advertising. Additionally, presidential elections are also on the runoff system, but then there is data available for only three election years. 14 Valid votes are those for any candidate, and blank votes. The other category is null votes. Federal law mandates that, over a period from 45 to 60 days preceding elections, part of the TV and radio daily grids are allocated free of charge to political advertising. 15 In case of runoff, political advertising is again mandatory, but for a period of roughly two weeks before elections. 16 In case of second round, the law mandates that the time be equally split among the two runner-off candidates. The difference in TV advertising time between rounds is explored as a source of exogenous variation in advertising time.
III -DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Two pieces of electoral data are used, both publicly available from the national electoral authority, the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). First, the voting record of all candidates in three different gubernatorial elections (1998, 2002 and 2006) , at the city-level. Second, the composition of the coalitions, which allows us to compute TV and radio advertising time for all three gubernatorial elections, according to the law described 15 From 1998 onwards, political advertising was aired over a period of 45-day that ended in the Friday before election, that is, two days before voters go to the ballots. Gubernatorial advertising were aired on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, in two blocks of 25 minutes each, one at lunchtime and another at prime night time. 16 From 1998 onwards, political advertising is transmitted starting 48 hours after the first-round results are announced officially by the local electoral authority (the TREs), and again end on the Friday before elections. Advertising was aired daily, in two blocks of 20 minutes each, one at lunchtime and another at prime night time. 17 There is considerable party switching in Brazil. Thus TV time allocation depends on which point of the legislature one considers. Until the 2004 elections, the relevant representation was at the beginning of the current legislature. For the 2006 elections, representation during the 2002 election was considered. Thus, actual representation at the time of elections is potentially different from the representation that determined the TV time allocation. As we will see below, this poses no challenge to our identification strategy.
above. 18 Air time is used as a proxy for advertising exposure. 19 City-level demographics are from the 2000 census.
Although we consider gubernatorial elections, the unit of observation is a city. There are two major advantages in using cities as a unit of observation. First, for the same election, we have several observations of voting behavior, which dramatically increases precision of estimation. Second, it provides much more variation at the voting unit, which allows us to investigate how the impact of TV advertising varies with demographics such as educational attainment, income, inequality, etc.
The sample consists of all gubernatorial races in which a second round was necessary, during three elections : 1998, 2002 and 2006. In total, there are 35 gubernatorial races in the sample, which took place in 18 different states and the Distrito Federal. 20 Table II contains information on the distribution of the sample, across states and municipalities. 18 For the elections prior to 2006, we only observe the composition at the end of the elected legislature. Since representatives can switch parties in the months between they are elected and when they are sworn in, which is the one relevant to compute TV time allocation. Hence, we observe TV time allocation with some noise. This should not be a reason for concern since party switching in this period, although it happens, is not such a relevant phenomenon. 19 Clearly, being aired is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to expose candidates to TV advertising. A finer measure of exposure is Gross Point Ratings (GRP), the number of times a TV set was turned at the time the advertising is aired. Unfortunately this information is private to broadcasters and perhaps candidates. 20 Distrito Federal, which includes Brasília (the federal capital) and several other cities (called satellite-cities), has the same legal status as a state. Results are unchanged if the Distrito Federal is excluded. Maranhão and Ceará. Incidentally, it includes the three most populous states (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais). In general, heterogeneity poses challenges for estimation as it makes omitted variable bias all more likely. In our case, the procedure accounts for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (which is incidentally all the relevant unobserved heterogeneity because the time lapse between cross-section observations is only three weeks). In this case, heterogeneity is desirable since it improves external validity. Finally, heterogeneity allow for estimating a different impact of advertising according to characteristics of the cities (see section V). (1994, 1998 and 2002) . PL and PSB), and several marginal parties. Thus the Brazilian political structure, which has not changed significantly over the sample period, is not concentrated, which is confirmed by the low Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. C 4 and C 2 ratios, however, are somewhat high, which suggest more concentration than low HHI and the large number of parties suggest. Therefore, first-round advertising time is neither too concentrated nor too dispersed. This not-so-concentrated structure is ideal as an empirical setting. Were 21 PFL has been renamed Democratas (DEM) in the first semester of 2007.
the Brazilian system similar to the American one, i.e., bipartisan with very marginal small parties, there would be very little variation in TV and radio time between rounds. 22 Were the system very dispersed, time differences between the first and second rounds would all be very large, and it would hard to identify the effect of advertising on elections' outcomes.
While TV advertising time is determined at the national level, local politics is what ultimately matters for gubernatorial elections. Data shows that TV advertising time -determined by national political strength -also reflect state-level political strength. Although there is some variation (correlation coefficients vary from 0.28 (Roraima in 1994) to 0.93 (Paraná in 2002)), twenty-three out of thirty-six of the estimated correlations are above 0.70. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the impact of TV using only first round variation in TV time. The average number of first round candidates, from 6.23 to 7.90, reflects the dispersion of the Brazilian party system. Note that the mean number of candidates minus one standard deviation is never less than 3.64, which is important for identification because otherwise there would not be sufficient variation in TV and radio time between rounds.
Summary statistics on TV time and vote share already contain the story of the paper. In the first-round, first placed candidates have, on average, more TV time share than second placed candidates. Inspection of columns (2) and (3) show that the difference in vote share between 1 st and 2 nd placed in the first round is larger than that of the second round, in relative and absolute terms. Since second round TV time is equally split, averages suggest a positive correlation between TV time and voting performance. Evidently, means can disguise relevant heterogeneity and non-linearities that may spuriously produce the results. Estimation strategy outlined in section IV solves these (potential) problems.
IV -EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Identification of advertising (and campaign expenditures) effects suffer from omitted variable and reverse causality biases. In the context of campaign expenditure, Levitt (1994) attempts to solve these problems by first-differencing the same pair of candidates over elections, hoping to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among candidate, such as political strength and candidate "quality". Two questions arise. First, campaign expenditures are still not randomly assigned to candidates. As a consequence, the question becomes whether it is reasonable to assume that quality and political strength can be safely assumed to be constant over an election period.
Similarly to Levitt (1994) , we use the strategy of first-differencing the same pair of candidates over two election cycles, which controls for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among candidates. There are, however, two major differences. First, in our case the two election cycles are in fact two rounds in the same election. This is a particularly interesting feature of the data. Since candidates rematch over a three-week period, odds are that relevant characteristics are constant. Second, but equally important, second round TV time allocation is determined by legislation, not by choice of the participants in the political game. Therefore, the difference in TV time between rounds is exogenously given, after controlling for candidate fixed-effects.
Therefore, the two major concerns about Levitt´s procedure -long interval between election cycles and nonrandom resource allocation -are solved.
The table II ). Second, and more importantly, in not all states, and consequently in not all cities, a second round was required in all three election years. (1), and no omission bias arises, as long as the identification hypothesis that i X is constant between rounds is valid, a reasonable assumption given the short interval of time between rounds. In fact, after first-differencing the data:
where ∆ is the difference between the second and first round.
Another potential problem is reverse causality. TV time is allocated according to the party's (or coalition's) representation at the Federal Congress. As long as state-level and national political power are related (and they are) It is conceivable that (1) is jointly determined with the following equation: Identification is again by using the dynamics of first and second round within the same election. Reverse causality arises because intrinsically stronger (or more able) candidates receive more first-round TV time.
Nevertheless, insofar as one controls for candidate fixed-effect (which as included in X e ) the difference in TV time between the first and second round is not determined by the difference in voting performance. In other words, after X e is accounted for, er votes dif _ does not belong to (3), i.e., κ = 0. First-difference does just that, and reverse causality becomes a lesser problem.
One problem remains, however. Judging by the first round TV shares, data suggests that first round winners are slightly stronger than runner-ups at the national level (see table V) . Therefore, TV time increases more to weaker candidates. Although intrinsic strength is controlled for when the data is first-differenced, nonlinearities in return of TV time may affect results. This possibility is taken care of by conveniently restricting the sample to those elections in which the runners-up had more TV time than the first-round winner.
Another potential problem arises from changes in coalitions between the first and the second rounds.
Ideally, everything else would be constant between the first and the second round, except for TV time. Clearly, at least one important thing changes: the number of contestants. What happens to other contestants? Normally, they support one of the second round contenders, either formally or informally. 26 Therefore, political support is not a variable that is stays constant over rounds (does not belong to X e ). Can political support from defeated candidates produce bias in the results? Since it is likely to affect voting performance, the answer is yeas if political support also systematically related to determinants of TV time. The most conceivable scenario is the following: suppose first round runners-up are more likely to receive support from defeated, and their TV time increase comparatively to first round winners (table V provide some weak evidence in favor of this later conjecture).
Then, increase in TV time will capture some of the political support effect.
While there is evidence to support the conjecture that defeated candidates tend to support runners-up (intuition would suggest otherwise), we cannot dismiss it with the available data. To assess whether it could affect the results, a robustness test is implemented. We select a sub-sample of election in which political was less relevant, where relevance is defined as the presence of pivotal third place in the first round. Let 1 _ e C votes be the number of votes of the third placed candidate in the first round. Define
first-round third placed candidates' support has the potential of changing the second round outcome. In this case, second round alliances tend to be more important phenomenon. By restricting the sample to elections e in which , 0 _ 1 = e pivotal C the possibility that changes in TV advertising time capture political support is significantly reduced.
V -RESULTS

V.I Main Results
Table VII contains the main results of the paper. The model is estimated with a set of pair electioncity dummies. 27 26 By formal support we mean a situation in which parties announce an agreement that normally involves positions in an eventual future administration. Informal support is when defeated candidates simply declare vote, usually without any form of reciprocity. 27 Since there are only two time-series observations (first and second round) results are equal to first-differencing and doing the so-called "fixed-effect procedure" (deviation from the average over time). See Woodridge (????). Notice that these results are not mechanically produced by that runners-up tend to "catch up". In fact, there is a "widening gap" effect: the estimated coefficient on the second round dummy is always positive and highly significant statistically. In other words, the absolute difference (in percentage points) between first-round runners-up and winners increases in the second round.
Estimates in column (2) and (3), although qualitative in line with the estimate in column (1), are somewhat intriguing. Most theories of omission and reverse causality suggest that sign of the bias is away from zero. The reason why first-difference estimates are larger than those of model (1) lies on non-linearities generated by the construction of the experiment. First-round runners-up, by definition, start behind in the second round (7 percentage points on average, see table VI). Furthermore, inspection of table VI shows that (as expected) runner-ups have less TV share in the first round. This implies that, on average, candidates that start behind in the race will gain TV share relative to their second-round opponents. If TV advertising has decreasing returns to scale, non-linearities will work towards inflating the estimates.
We assess the relevance of non-linearities by estimating (2) for two different sub-samples of elections:
one of elections in which the first-round winners had less first round TV share then runners-up, and vice-versa.
Results are in columns (4) and (5). Indeed, when runners-up had more TV time (0.241, column (4)), the effect of TV advertising is lower than in column (1), which is compatible with the theoretical bias induced by omission and reverse causality. When runners-up had less TV time (column (5)), results are even stronger than in column
(3). For this reason, our preferred estimate of TV advertising time is in column (4): a one percentage point increase in the share of TV time causes a 0.241 percentage point increase in vote share difference.
To assess whether this effect is practically relevant, consider the TV time distribution in 1998, when the difference in share between runners-up and winner was smallest: 4 percentage points (table VI) All results are as expected. TV exposure has more influence in less educated, more populous, more rural, poorer and more unequal cities. Electricity penetration is not universal in rural areas in Brazil, which reduces TV exposure. Notice that in columns (2), the coefficient associated with rural is positive (but not indistinguishable from zero), while in column (6) it is positive and significant. Since urban places tend to be poorer and less educated, the negative coefficient would only arise after controlling for income or education, or both. Larger cities favor impersonal, mass media means of communication. Similarly to the effect of rural, larger cities tend to be richer and better educated. Thus the coefficient on Log(Population) should go up from columns (1) to (6). Better educated people have access to sources of information other than television (newspapers, magazines, etc) . Finally TV has a stronger impact in poor and unequal cities. Similarly to education, richer people are likely to have better access to information. After controlling for income per capita, inequality (higher Gini) should increase the impact of TV: after a certain level, income is not likely to improve acquisition of information. Notice that, despite including er votes dif _ six times, parameters are still very precisely estimated. This is due to the larger number of observations and the large variation in the regressors (see table VIII) .
VI -CONCLUSION
From received literature, there is a conventional wisdom that campaign spending and media have "minimal effects" on elections outcome. In this paper, using a quasi-experiment data, we present evidence contrary to the conventional wisdom: TV and radio exposure in gubernatorial elections in Brazil have a significant effect on elections outcome, both practically and statistically. The magnitude -half the average closing gap from first to second round in gubernatorial elections -suggests that TV advertising cannot always predict elections outcome, but is one of the major factors in elections.
How can one reconcile our results with a large literature that says differently? The empirical literature on campaign spending and media effects suffer from either one of two problem It is either not persuasive that the omission and reverse causality problems are properly solved or, in the way of solving, throw so much variation away that it is difficult to estimate anything. In contrast with the literature we have access to a source of significant exogenous variation.
Another avenue for reconciliation is in table IX. Brazil is poorly education, middle income, urbanized, with the presence of very cities and, least but not least, with a very unequal income distribution. According to table IX, Brazil scores 4.5 out of 5 in the factors that magnify the impact of TV advertising. This is certainly a issue worth further research Total  13  19  29  19  55  30  51  44  17  13  73  18 Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) 
